F.I.R PERTAINING TO THE OFFENCE 498A IPC QUASHED

F.I.R PERTAINING TO THE OFFENCE 498A IPC & SECTION 3 & 4 OF DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT QUASHED.

In a very recent case titled “Abhishek Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Criminal Appeal No.1457 of 2015” decided on 31.08.2023, a three judges bench of the Supreme Court comprising Hon’ble Justices Aniruddha Bose, Sanjay Kumar & S.V.N Bhatti, held that an FIR can be quashed even after filing of the charge sheet during the pendency of the petition of quashing of the FIR. The Supreme Court has made such an observation while hearing an appeal pertaining to the offence of 498A IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The appeal was filed by the Mother-in-law and two brothers-in-law of the complainant. 

The factual background of the case:-

The facts of the case as mentioned in the judgment are that the Complainant, the second respondent married Nimish Gour in the year 2007. He, however, secured a decree of divorce on 05.09.2019 dissolving their marriage. Complainant preferred First Appeal No. 1876 of 2019 against the said divorce decree and the same is stated to be pending consideration before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The appellants in the present appeals were Complainant’s in-laws. Kusum Lata was her mother-in-law while Abhishek and Sourabh were her brothers-in-law. The complainant married Nimish on 02.07.2007. Their marriage was an arranged one and was performed in Indore, Madhya Pradesh. The complainant was a teacher by profession. Nimish was working in the film industry in Mumbai and was engaged in film editing. After their marriage, the couple left for Mumbai on 08.07.2007. The complainant is stated to have visited her in-laws in Madhya Pradesh on 3 or 4 occasions only, including the Deepavali festival in 2008. Admittedly, the Complainant parted ways with her matrimonial home in Mumbai on 25.02.2009, be it of her own volition or otherwise, and started residing with her parents at Narsinghpur. At that time, Kusum Lata had submitted representation dated 24.02.2009 to Police Station Heera Nagar at Indore, apprehending that the Complainant may make allegations against them about harassing her for dowry. Prior to the filing of the divorce petition by Nimish on 08.05.2013, the Complainant made a written complaint on 05.02.2013 to Police Station Kotwali, District Narsinghpur, leveling several allegations against her husband and her in-laws. The same was sent to the jurisdictional police station at Heera Nagar, Indore. In consequence, FIR No. 56 of 2013 dated 09.02.2013 was registered on the file of P.S. Heera Nagar, Indore, against all four of them under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. All three appellants secured anticipatory bail on 06.03.2013 in relation to FIR No. 56 dated 09.02.2013 from the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Indore, vide Bail Application No. 634 of 2013. The appellants then moved the Madhya Pradesh High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Kusum Lata and Sourabh filed M.Cr.C. No. 6585 of 2013 while M.Cr.C. No. 2647 of 2014 was filed by Abhishek, praying for quashing of FIR No. 56 of 2013 dated 09.02.2013 insofar as they were concerned. During the pendency of these cases, the police completed their investigation and filed a charge sheet against all four accused. The same was taken on file in Criminal Case No. 11954 of 2014 by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore. Thereupon, Kusum Lata and Sourabh filed an application on 13.08.2014 in M.Cr.C. No. 6585 of 2013 laying a challenge to the charge sheet and the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 11954 of 2014. However, by separate orders dated 03.03.2015, the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed both the quash petitions. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants are before this Court by way of these appeals by special leave. By a common order dated 30.10.2015 passed in both the appeals, this Court stayed further proceedings qua the appellants.     

Observation of the Court:-

This being the factual backdrop, we may note at the very outset that the contention that the appellants’ quash petition against the FIR was liable to be dismissed, in any event, as the charge sheet in relation thereto was submitted before the Court and taken on file, needs mention only to be rejected.

Judgments Relied Upon:-

 It is well settled that the High Court would continue to have the power to entertain and act upon a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR even when a charge sheet is filed by the police during the pendency of such petition [See Joseph Salvaraj A. vs. State of Gujarat and others {(2011) 7 SCC 59}]. This principle was reiterated in Anand Kumar Mohatta and another vs. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home, and another [(2019) 11 SCC 706]. This issue, therefore, needs no further elucidation on our part. The contours of the power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are well defined. In V. Ravi Kumar vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Salem, Tamil Nadu and others [(2019) 14 SCC 568], this Court affirmed that where an accused seeks quashing of the FIR, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, it is wholly impermissible for the High Court to enter into the factual arena to adjudge the correctness of the allegations in the complaint. In M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure (P). Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra and others [Criminal Appeal No.330 of 2021, decided on 13.04.2021], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court elaborately considered the scope and extent of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and in the rarest of rare cases, such standard not be confused with the norm formulated in the context of the death penalty. It was further observed that while examining the FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made therein, but if the Court thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, and more particularly, the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866) and State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335], the Court would have jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint. Instances of a husband’s family members filing a petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against them by his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes are neither a rarity nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty abound on this score. We may now take note of some decisions of particular relevance. Recently, in Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam and others vs. State of Bihar and others [(2022) 6 SCC 599], this Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation where the High Court had refused to quash an FIR registered for various offences, including Section 498A IPC. Noting that the foremost issue that required determination was whether allegations made against the in-laws were general omnibus allegations that would be liable to be quashed, this Court referred to earlier decisions wherein concern was expressed over the misuse of Section 498A IPC and the increased tendency to implicate relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes. This Court observed that false implications by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial disputes, if left unchecked, would result in

misuse of the process of law. On the facts of that case, it was found that no specific allegations were made against the in-laws by the wife and it was held that allowing their prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws would result in an abuse of the process of law. It was also noted that a criminal trial, leading to an eventual acquittal, would inflict severe scars upon the accused and such an exercise ought to be discouraged.

In Preeti Gupta and another vs. State of Jharkhand and another [(2010) 7 SCC 667], this Court noted that the tendency to implicate the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon in complaints filed under Section 498A IPC. It was observed that the Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases, such as allegations of harassment by the husband’s close relations, who were living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided, would add an entirely different complexion and such allegations would have to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection. Earlier, in Neelu Chopra and another vs. Bharti [(2009) 10 SCC 184], this Court observed that the mere mention of statutory provisions and the language thereof, for lodging a complaint, is not the ‘be-all and end-all’ of the matter, as what is required to be brought to the notice of the Court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in the commission of that offence. These observations were made in the context of a matrimonial dispute involving Section 498A IPC.  Of more recent origin is the decision of this Court in Mahmood Ali and others vs. State of U.P. and others (Criminal Appeal No. 2341 of 2023, decided on 08.08.2023) on the legal principles applicable apropos Section 482 Cr.P.C. Therein, it was observed that when an accused comes before the High Court, invoking either the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed, essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances, the High Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. It was further observed that it will not be enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not as, in frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, to try and read between the lines. In Bhajan Lal (supra), this Court had set out, by way of illustration, the broad categories of cases in which the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised. Para 102 of the decision reads as follows:

‘102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an

investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of

any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

CONCLUSION:-

 Given the totality of the facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the Complainant’s allegations against the appellants, such as they are, are wholly insufficient and, prima facie, do not make out a case against them. Further, they are so farfetched and improbable that no prudent person can conclude that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against them. In effect, the case on hand falls squarely in categories (1) and (5) set out in Bhajan Lal (supra). Permitting the criminal process to go on against the appellants in such a situation would, therefore, result in clear and patent injustice. This was a fit case for the High Court to exercise its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR and the consequential proceedings. The appeals are accordingly allowed. FIR No. 56 of 2013 and Criminal Case No. 11954 of 2014 pending on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore, shall stand quashed insofar as the appellants, Kusum Lata, Abhishek Gour, and Sourabh Gour, are concerned. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.