JUDGMENTS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES

1.S.R.Batra Vs. Smt.Taruna Batra Civil Appeal No.5837 of 2006 Dated 15.12.2006 (2007) 3 SCC 169  Supreme Court.

In this case, the Supreme Court with reference to definition of shared household under sec.2(s) of  PWDV Act.2005 held that the definition of ‘shared household’ in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting requires to be interpreted in a sensible manner. The Court further held that under Sec. 17(1) of the PWDV Act wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a ‘shared household’ would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. In the case, the property in question neither belonged to the husband nor was it taken on rent by him nor was it a joint family property of which the husband was a member. It was the exclusive property of mother of husband and not a shared household. However this judgment has been over ruled by the Supreme Court in Very Recent judgment in the case of Satish Chander Ahuja Vs. Sneha Ahuja Civil Appeal No.2483 of 2020 dated 15.10.2020.

2. Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel Vs. Vatsalben Ashokbhai Patel and Ors. (2008) 4 SCC 649 Supreme Court.

In this case, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the provisions of Act, 2005. The question which came for consideration in the above case has been noticed in paragraph 14 of the judgment, which is to the following effect:- “14. The questions which arise for consideration are: (i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the property of Appellant 1 could have been sold in auction? and (ii) Whether in a case of this nature, the bail granted to the appellants should have been directed to be cancelled?”  In the above case, the complaint was filed by third respondent against her husband and appellant’s father-in-law and mother-in-law under Sections 406 and 114 of Indian Penal Code. The bail granted to the appellants was cancelled. Proceedings under Section 82 Cr.P.C. were initiated attaching the properties of the appellant. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate asked the District Magistrate to auction the attached properties. The properties of the appellant was auctioned and the Supreme Court in the above case has held that the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 that maintenance of a wife, during subsistence of marriage, is on the husband and on the applicant to maintain the daughter-in-law arises only when the husband has died. In paragraphs 21 and 22 following was laid down:- “21. Maintenance of a married wife, during subsistence of marriage, is on the husband. It is a personal obligation. The obligation to maintain a daughter-in-law arises only when the husband has died. Such an obligation can also be met from the properties of which the husband is a co-sharer and not otherwise. For invoking the said provision, the husband must have a share in the property. The property in the name of the mother-in-law can neither be a subject matter of attachment nor during the lifetime of the husband, her personal liability to maintain his wife can be directed to be enforced against such property. Wholly uncontentious issues have been raised before us on behalf of Sonalben (wife). It is well settled that apparent state of affairs of state shall be taken as real state of affairs. It is not for an owner of the property to establish that it is his self acquired property and the onus would be on the one, who pleads contra. Sonalben might be entitled to maintenance from her husband. An order of maintenance might have been passed but in view of the settled legal position, the decree, if any, must be executed against her husband and only his properties could be attached  but not of her mother-in-law. In paragraph 27, the Supreme Court further held:-  The Domestic Violence Act provides for a higher right in favour of a wife. She not only acquires a right to be maintained but also there under acquires a right of residence. The right of residence is a higher right. The said right as per the legislation extends to joint properties in which the husband has a share. In paragraph 28, the Supreme Court noticed the judgment passed in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in cancelling the bail of the appellants. Allowing the appeal, following directions were issued:- Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the opinion that the interest of justice shall be subserved if the impugned judgments are set aside with the following directions: (i) The property in question shall be released from attachment. (ii) The 3rd respondent shall refund the sum of Rs 1 lakh to the respondent with interest @ 6% per annum. (iii) The amount of Rs 4 lakhs deposited by the 1st respondent shall be refunded to him immediately with interest accrued thereon. (iv)The 3rd respondent should be entitled to pursue her remedies against her husband in accordance with law. (v) The learned Magistrate before whom the cases filed by the 3rd respondent are pending should bestow serious consideration of disposing of the same, as expeditiously as possible. (vi)The 3rd respondent shall bear the costs of the appellant which are quantified at Rs 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand) consolidated.

In the above case, the Supreme Court has held that property of mother-in-law cannot be attached since the maintenance of wife during the married life is on the husband.

3. D. Veluswamy Vs. D. Patchaiammal (Crl.Appeal No.2028-2029 of 2010) Supreme Court.

In this case the Supreme Court has given, a wider meaning to an “aggrieved person” under sec. 2 (a) of the PWDV Act 2005. The Court enumerated five ingredients of a live in relationship as follows: 1.Both the parties must be as husband and wife and are recognized as husband and wife in front of society 2.They must be of a valid legal age of marriage 3.They should qualify to enter into marriage eg. None of the partner should have a souse living at the time of entering into relationship.4.They must have voluntarily cohabited for a significant period of time 5.They must have lived together in a shared household. The Supreme Court also observed that not all live-­in­-relationships   will   amount   to   a relationship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of PWDV Act. To get such benefit the conditions mentioned above shall be fulfilled and this has to be proved by evidence.

4. Sandhya Manoj Wankhade Vs. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade (2011) 3 SCC 650 Supreme Court.

In this case it has been held by the Supreme Court that the term “respondent” includes the term “female relative” .The legislature never intended to exclude female relative of the husband or male partner from the ambit of a complaint that can be made under the provisions of the Act.

5. Deoki Panjhiyara Vs. Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad & Anr. Crl.Appeal No.2032-2033 of 2012 decided on 12.12.2012 Supreme Court.

In this Case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the respondent before us had claimed (before the trial court as well as the High

Court) that the marriage between him and the appellant solemnized on 4.12.2006, by performance of rituals in accordance with Hindu Law, was void on account of the previous marriage between the appellant with one Rohit Kumar Mishra. In support thereof, the respondent relied on a marriage certificate dated 18.4.2003 issued under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Acting solely on the basis of the aforesaid marriage certificate the learned trial court as well as the High Court had proceeded to determine the validity of the marriage between the parties though both the courts were exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding for maintenance. However, till date, the marriage between the parties is yet to be annulled by a competent court. What would be the effect of the above has to be determined first inasmuch as if, under the law, the marriage between the parties still subsists the appellant would continue to be the legally married wife of the respondent so as to be entitled to claim maintenance and other benefits under the DV Act, 2005. Infact, in such a situation there will be no occasion for the Court to consider whether the relationship between the parties is in the nature of a marriage admittedly, both the appellant and the respondent are governed by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act makes it clear that a marriage solemnized after the commencement of the Act “shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto against the other party, be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions so specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5.”

While considering the provisions of Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 this Court in Yamunabai v. Anantrao has taken the view that a marriage covered by Section 11 is void-ipso-jure, that is, void from the very inception. Such a marriage has to be ignored as not existing in law at all. It was further held by this Court that a formal declaration of the nullity of such a marriage is not a mandatory requirement though such an option is available to either of the parties to a marriage. It must, however, be noticed that in Yamunabai there was no dispute between the parties either as regards the existence or the validity of the first marriage on the basis of which the second marriage was held to be ipso jure void. In the present case, however, the appellant in her pleadings had clearly, categorically and consistently denied that she was married to any person known as Rohit Kumar Mishra. The legitimacy, authenticity and genuineness of the marriage certificate dated 18.4.2003 has also been questioned by the appellant. Though Section 11 of the aforesaid Act gives an option to either of the parties to a void marriage to seek a declaration of invalidity/nullity of such marriage,

In the present case, if according to the respondent, the marriage between him and the appellant was void on account of the previous marriage between the appellant and Rohit Kumar Mishra the respondent ought to have obtained the necessary declaration from the competent court in view of the highly contentious questions raised by the appellant on the aforesaid score. It is only upon a declaration of nullity or annulment of the marriage between the parties by a competent court that any consideration of the question whether the parties had lived in a “relationship in the nature of marriage” would be justified. In the absence of any valid decree of nullity or the necessary declaration the court will have to proceed on the footing that the relationship between the parties is one of marriage and not in the nature of marriage.

6. Indra Sarma Vs. V.K.V.Sarma (Crl.A. No.2009 of 2013) decided on 26.11.2013 Supreme Court.

The case in hand is a land mark judgment which defined the scope and ambit of Sec. 2 (f) of PWDV Act 2005. In this Case it has been held that a woman who was in a live-in relationship with a married man for 14 years was not accorded the fruits of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.It is further held that such a live-in relationship fell outside the purview of 'relationship in the nature of marriage.  While arriving at this conclusion, which has far-reaching implications on rights of aggrieved persons in non-matrimonial relationships, the Supreme Court laid down various criteria for the purpose of determining as to what kind of relationships would fall within the ambit of the expression 'relationship in the nature of marriage' as worded in the section2(f) of PWDV Act.2005.

7. Preeti Satija Vs. Raj Kumari and Anr  2014 SCC Online Del 188  Delhi High Court.

In this judgment the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court laid down following:- Crucially, Parliament's intention by the 2005 Act was to secure the rights of aggrieved persons in the shared household, which could be tenanted by the Respondent (including relative of the husband) or in respect of which the Respondent had jointly or singly any right, title, interest, or “equity”. For instance, a widow (or as in this case, a daughter in law, estranged from her husband) living with a mother-in-law, in premises owned by the latter, falls within a “domestic relationship”. The obligation not to disturb the right to residence in the shared household would continue even if the mother-in-law does not have any right, title or interest, but is a tenant, or entitled to “equity” (such as an equitable right to possession) in those premises. This is because the premises would be a “shared household”. The daughter-in-law, in these circumstances is entitled to protection from dispossession, though her husband never had any ownership rights in the premises. The right is not dependent on title, but the mere factum of residence. Thus, even if the mother-in-law is a tenant, then, on that ground, or someone having equity, she can be injected from dispossessing the daughter in law. In case the mother in law is the owner, the obligation to allow the daughter in law to live in the shared household, as long as the matrimonial relationship between her and the husband subsists, continues. The only exception is the proviso to 19(1) 72 (b), which exempts women from being directed to remove themselves from the shared household. No such exception has been carved out for the other reliefs under Section 19, especially in respect of protection orders. Had the Parliament intended to create another exception in favor of women, it would have done so. This omission was deliberate and in consonance with the rest of the scheme of the Act. There can be other cases of domestic relationships such as an orphaned sister, or widowed mother, living in her brother's or son's house. Both are covered by the definition of domestic relationship, as the brother is clearly a Respondent. In such a case too, if the widowed mother or sister is threatened with dispossession, they can secure reliefs under the Act, notwithstanding exclusive ownership of the property by the son or brother. Thus, excluding the right of residence against properties where the husband has no right, share, interest or title, would severely curtail the extent of the usefulness of the right to residence. The other aspect, which this Court wishes to highlight, is that the 2005 Act applies to all communities, and was enacted “to provide more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family”. The right to residence and creation of mechanism to enforce is a ground breaking measure, which Courts should be alive to. Restricting the scope of the remedies, including in respect of the right to reside in shared household, would undermine the purpose of this enactment. It is, therefore, contrary to the scheme and the objects of the Act, as also the unambiguous text of Section 2(s), to restrict the application of the 2005 Act to only such cases where the husband alone owns some property or has a share in it. Crucially, the mother-in-law (or a father-in-law, or for that matter, “a relative of the husband”) can also be a Respondent in the proceedings under the 2005 Act and remedies available under the same Act would necessarily need to be enforced against them.

8. Navneet Arora Vs. Surender Kaur and Ors 2014 SCC Online Del 7617 Delhi High Court.

 In this case the Court had considered the various aspects of Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Dealing with right of residence and  following was held:- “ It may be highlighted that the Act does not confer any title or proprietary rights in favour of the aggrieved person as misunderstood by most, but merely secures a ‘right of residence’ in the ‘shared household’. Section 17(2) clarifies that the aggrieved person may be evicted from the ‘shared household’ but only in accordance with the procedure established by law. The legislature has taken care to calibrate and balance the interests of the family members of the respondent and mitigated the rigour by expressly providing under the proviso to Section 19(1) that whilst adjudicating an application preferred by the aggrieved person it would not be open to the Court to pass directions for removing a female member of the respondents family from the “shared household”. Furthermore, in terms of Section 19(1)(f), the Court may direct the respondent to secure same level of accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the “shared household” or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require. The seemingly ‘radical’ provisions comprised in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 must be understood and appreciated in light of the prevalent culture and ethos in our society. The broad and inclusive definition of the term ‘shared household’ in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is in consonance with the family patterns in India, where married couple continue to live with their parents in homes owned by parents.”

9. Hiral P. Harsora and others Vs. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and others, (2016) 10 SCC 165 Supreme Court.

 In this Case the Supreme Court has struck down the expression “adult male”. The Supreme Court held that “adult male person” restricting the meaning of respondent in Section 2(q) to only “adult male person” is not based on any intelligible differentia having rational nexus with object sought to be achieved. Hence, it is now permissible under definition of Section 2(q) to include females also. Consequently, the respondent can also be a female in domestic relationship with the aggrieved person. The next definition, which is relevant to be noticed is Section 2(s), which defines shared household. Shared household is defined in following words:-  "shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the  aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household.

10. Shalu Ojha Vs. Prashant Ojha SLP (Crl.) no. 3935 of 2016 dated 23.07.2018 Supreme Court. In this case, matrimonial relationship was strained between petitioner wife and respondent husband resulting in multiplicity of legal proceedings. Petitioner filed a case claiming remedies under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, trial court awarded an interim maintenance of Rs 2,50,000 and compensation of Rs. 1,00,000. In appeal filed

against the award, the Session Court reduced maintenance to Rs. 50,000. Appeal preferred by respondent husband was dismissed and SLP was also dismissed. While appeal was still pending before High Court, petitioner wife preferred appeal before Supreme Court challenging order passed by Sessions court. The court held that proceedings under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, are summary proceedings in nature, petitioner wife was allowed to file a suit under provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 or section 125 of CrPC, 1973 where both parties can present their evidences before competent court. Respondent husband was directed to continue paying maintenance of Rs. 50,000 per month.

11. Kunapareddy @ Nookala Sanka Bala ji Vs.Kunaparddy Swarna Kumari & Anr. (Crl.Appeal No.516 of 2016 decided on 18.04.2016 Supreme Court.

The major issue that arises for consideration in the instant case is whether a court

dealing with the petition/complaint filed under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 can allow amendments. The dispute was also in nature of proceeding i.e. whether it was of civil or criminal nature. The main contention of the herein appellant was that Section 28 of DV Act says proceedings under this act should be governed by Cr.P.C and because Cr.P.C does not allow amendments and allowing amendments under C.P.C is violation of the provision, therefore the Trial Court and High Court was mistaken in allowing the amendments. It was held by the Supreme Court that the order passed for amendments by the Trial Court was rightly upheld by the High Court. The court said that it cannot be said that the court dealing with the application under the DV Act has no power and/or no jurisdiction to allow the amendment of the said application.

12. Samir Vidyasagar Bhardwaj Vs. Nandita Samir Bhardwaj (Crl. Appeal No.6450/2017 decided on 09.05.2017 Supreme Court.

In this Case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the respondent filed a petition under Sec 27(1)(d) of the Special Marriage Act for divorce

against the appellant in the family court in Mumbai. The respondent sought relief – directing the appellant to move out of the matrimonial home and hand over the vacant possession of the same to respondent and to pay a maintenance of Rs.1,00,000 and other consequential reliefs apart from seeking dissolution of marriage. It is a proved fact that the concerned flat was purchased in the joint names of the appellant and respondent. The family court arrived

at a finding that prima facie material was available on record to accept the allegation of the respondent wife on domestic violence. The Judge concerned had exercised his discretion under Section 19(1)(b) of the Domestic Violence Act which provides that the Magistrate on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place can remove the spouse from the shared household. The appellant husband appealed to High Court contending that the final relief sought in the main petition could not have been granted at interim stage and also being co-owner of the flat, he cannot be ousted. The High Court declined to interfere with the order. Supreme Court also decided that the family court has correctly applied its discretion on Section 19(1)(b) of DV Act.

13. Manmohan Attavar Vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar, (2017) 8 SCC 550 Supreme Court.

In this case it has been held that PWDV Act.2005 has been enacted to create an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence. A reading of the aforesaid provisions shows that it creates an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence under the "shared household" irrespective of her having any legal interests in the same. The direction, inter alia, can include an order restraining dispossession or a direction to remove himself on being satisfied that domestic violence had taken place. Now, we proceed to notice certain provisions of Act, 2005, which are relevant for determination of the issues as arisen in the present appeal. According to Section 2(a) “aggrieved person” means any person, who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. “Domestic Relationship” has been defined in Section 2(f) in following words:- 2(f) "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. The expression “respondent” is defined in Section 2 (q) in following words:- 2(q) "respondent" means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner.

14.Vaishali Abhimanyu Joshi Vs. Nana Saheb Gopal Joshi (C.A.No.6448 of 2017 ) decided on 09.05.2017 Supreme Court.

In the above case, the appellant was married with one Abhimanyu with whom she was residing in suit Flat No.4, 45/4, Arati Society, Shivvihar Colony, Paud Fata, Pune. The husband filed a suit for divorce against the appellant. The father-in-law filed a suit in Small Cause Court for mandatory injunction praying that defendant be directed to stop the occupation and use of the suit flat. The appellant filed a written statement in the suit claiming that although the flat bears the name of the respondent but she is residing in the suit flat. She filed a counter claim claiming that flat is a shared household and the suit be dismissed. The counter claim was rejected by the Judge, Small Cause Court, against which revision as well as the writ petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court noted the question, which arose for consideration in the above case in paragraph 16, which is to the following effect:-  As noted above, the only question to be answered in this appeal is as to whether the counter claim filed by the appellant seeking right of residence in accordance with Section 19 of the 2005 Act in a suit filed by the respondent, her father-in-law under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 is entertainable or not?. Whether the provisions of the 1887 Act bar entertainment of such counterclaim, is the moot question to be answered? . After noticing the provision of Section 26 of the Act, the Supreme Court made following observations. Section 26 of the Act is a special provision which has been enacted in the enactment. Although  Chapter IV of the Act containing Section 12 to Section 29 contains the procedure for obtaining orders of reliefs by making application before the Magistrate whereas steps taken by the Magistrate and different categories of reliefs could be granted as noted in Sections 18 to 22 and certain other provisions. Section 26 provides that any relief available under Sections 18 to 22 may also be sought in any legal proceedings, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent. Section 26 is material for the present case since the appellant has set up her counterclaim on the basis of this section before the Judge, Small Cause Court. Section 26 is extracted below: “26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—(1) Any relief available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act. (2) Any relief referred to in subsection (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court. (3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief. There cannot be any dispute that proceeding before the Judge, Small Cause Court is a legal proceeding and the Judge, Small Cause Court is a civil court. On the strength of Section 26, any relief available under Sections 18 to 22 of the 2005 Act, thus, can also be sought by the aggrieved person. The Supreme Court held that Section 26 has to be interpreted in a manner to effectuate the purpose and object of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the determination of claim of the aggrieved person was necessary in the suit to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The Supreme Court laid down following . Section 26 of the 2005 Act has to be interpreted in a manner to effectuate the very purpose and object of the Act. Unless the determination of claim by an aggrieved person seeking any order as contemplated by the 2005 95 Act is expressly barred from consideration by a civil court, this Court shall be loath to read in bar in consideration of any such claim in any legal proceeding before the civil court. When the proceeding initiated by the plaintiff in the Judge, Small Cause Court alleged termination of gratuitous licence of the appellant and prays for restraining the appellant from using the suit flat and permit the plaintiff to enter and use the flat, the right of residence as claimed by the appellant is interconnected with such determination and refusal of consideration of claim of the appellant as raised in her counterclaim shall be nothing but denying consideration of claim as contemplated by Section 26 of the 2005 Act which shall lead to multiplicity of proceedings, which cannot be the object and purpose of the 2005 Act. We, thus, are of the considered opinion that the counterclaim filed by the appellant before Judge, Small Cause Court in Civil Suit No. 77 of 2013 was fully entertainable and the courts below committed error in refusing to consider such claim.

15. Lalita Toppo Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. (Crl.Appeal No.1656 of 2015 decided on 30.10.2018 Supreme Court.

In this case the appellant Lalita Toppo claimed maintenance under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 despite the fact that she was not a legally wedded wife and thus was not eligible to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

It is held that the maintenance can be claimed under Domestic Violence Act, 2005 even if the claimant is not a legally wedded wife. Such relief cannot be allowed under section 125 of CrPC. The bench expanded the definition of the term “domestic violence” contained in Section 3(a) of the D.V Act, 2015 to include economic abuse as domestic violence. Further, the court held that the estranged wife or live-in-partner would be entitled to extra relief under the provisions in Section 3(a) of the D.V Act, 2005 than what is provided under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.

16. Kamlesh Devi Vs. Jai Pal & Ors. SLP (Crl.)Diary No.34053 of 2019 Decided on 04.10.2019 Supreme Court.

This special leave petition was directed against an order dated 16th September, 2016 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, dismissing Criminal Revision No.609/2015, filed by the petitioner under Section 401 of Cr.P.C .By a judgment dated 22nd October, 2012 the Judicial Magistrate (First Class) dismissed a complaint filed by the petitioner under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act.2005.An appeal filed by the petitioner against the said judgment and order has been dismissed. The revisional application filed by the petitioner under Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the appellate order of the Sessions Judge and the judgment and order of the Judicial Magistrate (First Class) has been dismissed by the order impugned in the special leave petition. It has been held in the present case that the High Court has rightly found in effect that the ingredients of domestic violence are wholly absent in this case. The petitioner and the respondents are not persons living together in a shared household. There is a vague allegation that the respondents are family members. There is not a whisper of the respondents with the petitioner .They appear to be neighbour, hence the Supreme Court has dismissed the Petition.

17. P.Rajkumar & Anr. Vs. Yoga @ yogalakshmi (Crl.Appeal No.1613/019 dated 23.10.2019.Supreme Court.

In this case the appellants has assailed an order dated 06.03.2015 passed by the High Court dismissing the criminal revision, declining to interfere with the order dated 20.01.2015 affirming order dated 28.09.2012 for grant of Rs.10,000/- as maintenance to the respondent in proceedings under section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.It was argued by the appellants that the claim for maintenance under section 20 of the Act was specifically negatived by the judicial magistrate as such the Magistrate could not have simultaneously ordered for maintenance in a pending proceeding under section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, the ‘Cr.P.C.’) over which he had no jurisdiction. It was also submitted that the respondent has since remarried. On behalf of the respondent Court’s attention was drawn to the interim order dated 12.10.2018 for payment of all arrears of maintenance. He however did not dispute the fact that the respondent has since remarried on 10.02.2019.It is held that admittedly, the respondent was denied any monetary compensation under section 20 of the Act by the learned Magistrate. Once the learned Magistrate declined to grant maintenance for reasons specified, it was not open for him to assume jurisdiction in a proceeding under section 125 of the Cr.P.C. which was not pending before him and was a completely independent proceeding to direct grant of maintenance under the same. The two being independent proceedings, the learned Magistrate wrongly assumed jurisdiction under Section 125 Cr.P.C in a proceeding under the Act. In effect, what the magistrate directly declined to the respondent, he granted indirectly by observing that till the proceedings under section 125 of Cr.P.C. is not decided, the appellants shall pay maintenance at a rate of Rs.2,000/- per month to the respondent. The order is without jurisdiction and therefore wholly unjustified and unsustainable. The respondent never challenged the order of the learned Magistrate declining monetary relief under section 20 of 3 the Act. The parties are however agreed that the amount of maintenance which has already been paid under the impugned orders shall not be recovered and also that any amount lying in deposit in the family court may be withdrawn by the respondent. The impugned orders, with the aforesaid exception, are set aside.

18. Ajay Kumar Vs. Lata @ Sharuti & Ors. (Crl.Appeal )No.617 of 2019 decided on 08.04.2019 Supreme Court.

In this case the first respondent filed a petition under Section 12 of the Act inter alia for the purpose of seeking an award of maintenance. The complaint contains a recital of the fact that after her marriage, the complainant and her spouse resided at a house which constitutes ancestral Hindu Joint Family Property. She and her husband resided on the ground floor of the residential accommodation. The appellant and the deceased spouse of the first respondent jointly carried on a business of a kiryana store at Panipat from which, it has been alleged, each had an income of about Rs 30,000 per month. The complaint alleges that at the death of Vijay Kumar, the first respondent was pregnant and that she gave birth to a child on 31 January 2013. The travails of the first respondent are alleged to have commenced after the death of her spouse and she was not permitted to reside in her matrimonial home. The learned Trial Judge by an order dated 3 July 2015 granted monthly maintenance in the amount of Rs 4,000 to the first respondent and Rs 2,000 to the second respondent. The award of maintenance was directed against the appellant who was carrying on the above business together with the deceased spouse of the first respondent. This order of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Panipat dated 3 July 2015 was confirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Panipat on 14 August 2018. The High Court, in a petition filed by the appellant, affirmed the view. Hence these proceedings came to be instituted under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Under the provisions of Section 20(1), the Magistrate while dealing with an application under sub Section (1) of Section 12 is empowered to direct the respondent(s) to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of domestic violence. This may include but is not limited to an order for maintenance of the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC or any other law for the time being in force. The expression “respondent” is defined in Section 2(q) as follows:- 2(q) “respondent” means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner; The substantive part of Section 2(q) indicates that the expression “respondent” means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom relief has been sought. The proviso indicates that both, an aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner, as the case may be. Section 2(f) defines the expression “domestic relationship” thus: 2(f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family; Section 2(f) defines the expression ‘domestic relationship’ to mean a relationship where two persons live or have lived together at any point of time in a shared household when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are members living together as a joint family. The expression “shared household” is defined in Section 2(s) as follows:- 2(s) “shared household” means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a house hold whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household; All these definitions indicate the width and amplitude of the intent of Parliament in creating both an obligation and a remedy in the terms of the enactment. In the present case, at this stage, it would be sufficient to advert to the contents of paragraph 10 of the complaint which read as follows:- “10. That the marriage between the Complainant No. 1 and Sh. Vijay Kumar Jindal was settled through Sh. Narender Jain S/o. Late Sh. Rameshwar Dass R/o Haryana SchoolWali-Gali, VIII, Inder Garhi, Tehsil Gohana, Distt. Sonepat, and before marriage he (Mediator namely Sh. Narender Jain) told that previously there was a residential house situated near Railway Fathak, Jatal Road, Panipat, which was constructed by Sh. Mai Dhan (Grandfather of Sh. Vijay Kumar Jindal and Respondent No. 2) and after the death of said Sh. Mai Dhan, his son Sh. Brahmanand Jindal (Father of Sh. Vijay Kumar Jindal and Respondent No. 2) became the owner in possession of the said house and later on Sh. Brahmanand Jindal, sold away the said house and purchased H No. 149, Eight Marla Colony, Kranti Nagar, Near Radha Krishna Mandir, Panipat in the name of his wife Smt. Rajo Devi (Respondent No. 1) about 8 years ago. Thus the said house i.e. H No. 149, Eight Marla Colony, Kranti Nagar, Near Radha Krishna Mandir, Panipat is ancestral Joint Hindu Family property / residential house standing in the name of Respondent No. 1 qua the present complainants.” In paragraph 12 and 13, it has been averred as follows:- “12. That after marriage between the Complainant No. 1 and Sh. Vijay Kumar Jindal, the Respondents provided the ground floor of H No. 149, Eight Marla Colony, Kranti Nagar, Near Radha Krishna Mandir, Panipat to the newly wedded couple (i.e. Complainant No. 1 and Sh. Vijay Kumar Jindal) and they kept all dowry articles, house hold articles etc. mentioned above in the said residential accommodation (ground floor of said house) and she (i.e. Complainant No. 1) also consummated her marriage with her husband in the Ground floor of said house and Kirti Jindal (Complainant No. 2) was born out of the said wedlock. It is pertinent to mention here that all dowry articles, istridhan, household articles, furniture etc. etc. are still kept in said house / matrimonial house of Complainant No. 1 and the golden ornaments and jewelry etc., all are yet in possession of the Respondents. 13. That it is worthwhile to mention here that after the marriage of Complainant No. 1, both brother Sh. Vijay Kumar Jindal and Ajay Kumar Jindal were running their joint  business of M/s. Ajay Kumar Vijay Kumar Kiryana Store, at Jatal Road, Sanjay Chowk Panipat, very smoothly and both brothers were taking / deciding Rs. 30,000/- P.M. each, out of the income of the said business, for the maintenance of their respective families. However after the death of Sh. Vijay Kumar, the Respondent No. 2 has been running the said business and the Complainants are equally entitled to the amount which the respondent No. 2 has been deducting from the said joint business or at least Rs. 30,000/- P.M. which the Complainant No. 1 has been receiving during the life time of Sh. Vijay Kumar Jindal.” At the present stage, there are sufficient averments in the complaint to sustain the order for the award of interim maintenance. Paragraph 10 of the complaint prima facie indicates that the case of the complainants is that the house where the first respondent and her spouse resided, belong to a joint family. The appellant and his brother (who was the spouse of the first respondent and father of the second respondent) carried on a joint business. The appellant resided in the same household. Ultimately, whether the requirements of Section 2(f); Section 2(q); and Section 2(s) are fulfilled is a matter of evidence which will be adjudicated upon at the trial. At this stage, for the purpose of an interim order for maintenance, there was material which justifies the issuance of a direction in regard to the payment of maintenance. However, we clarify that the present order as well as orders which have been passed by the courts below shall not come in the way of a final adjudication on the merits of the complaint in accordance with law. The arrears shall be paid over within a period of four months from today by equal monthly installments.

19. Satish Chander Ahuja Vs. Sneha Ahuja Civil Appeal No.2483 of 2020 dated 15.10.2020 Supreme Court.

In this land mark judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the term “shared household” under Section 2(s) does not only mean a household of the joint family of which husband is a member or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a share. Instead, it means the household belonging to any relative of the husband with whom the women has lived in a domestic relationship.

The Court, therefore, overruled the law laid down in SR Batra v. Taruna Batra [(2007) 3 SCC 169].

 20.Vineeta Sharma Vs. Rakaesh Sharma & Ors.2020 SCC online SC 641 Supreme Court.

In this land mark judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that daughters have equal right in coparcenaries by birth and it is not necessary that the father should be living when the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 came into force for the daughters to get a share. The Court observed that-

“The conferral of right is by birth, and the rights are given in the same manner with incidents of coparcener as that of a son and she is treated as a coparcener in the same manner with the same rights as if she had been a son at the time of birth.”

To ensure that this decision does not lead to reopening of earlier family settlements or partition suits already decreed, the apex court held that a registered settlement or partition suit decreed prior to December 20, 2004 (the date when the Amendment Bill was tabled in Rajya Sabha), will not be reopened.

21. Smt.S.Vanitha Vs. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District C.A No. 3822 of 2020 dated 15.12.2020 Supreme Court.

The Three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India comprising of J. Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J. Indu Malhotra and J. Indira Banerjee had held that provisions of Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be invoked by in-laws to evict their daughter in law as it would deprive her of rights in a shared household under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 .It is further observed that allowing the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to have an overriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective of competing entitlements of a woman to a right in a shared household within the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005, would defeat the object and purpose which the Parliament sought to achieve in enacting the latter legislation. The law protecting the interest of senior citizens is intended to ensure that they are not left destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives. Equally, the purpose of the PWDV Act 2005 cannot be ignored by a sleight of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations have to be harmoniously construed. Hence the right of a woman to secure a residence order in respect of a shared household cannot be defeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction by adopting the summary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act 2007. The Bench held that the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act has no overriding effect over the right of residence of a woman in a shared household within the meaning of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act.

22. “Shyam Lal Devda & Anr. vs. Parimala (Crl.appeal.no.141/2020 )”decided on 22.01.2020. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “In the present case, the respondent is residing with her parents within the territorial limits of Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Bengaluru. In view of Section 27(1)

(a) of the Act, the Metropolitan Magistrate court, Bengaluru has the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and take cognizance of the offence. There is no merit in the contention raising objection as to the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Magistrate Court at Bengaluru. In the result, Crl. Misc. No.53 of 2015 filed against the appellants No.3 to 13 is quashed and this appeal is partly allowed. The learned VI Additional Metropolitan Magistrate at Bengaluru shall proceed with Crl. Misc. No.53 of 2015 against appellants No.1, 2 and 14 and dispose the same in accordance with law. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.