SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS SENIOR CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO EVICT

Eviction under the Senior Citizens Act: An analysis of the Judgment “Rajeswar Prasad Roy v. State of Bihar” dated 30.01.2025 passed by the Supreme Court in light of the previous rulings.

In a significant judgment the Supreme Court in the case of Rajeswar Prasad Roy v. State of Bihar & Ors. (Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 7675/2024) reinstated an eviction order passed by the Maintenance Tribunal in favour of a 75-year-old father, directing his son and daughter-in-law to vacate his self-acquired property. This judgment reinforces the authority of Maintenance Tribunals under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, especially regarding the eviction of children who jeopardize the mental and physical well-being of senior citizens. The fact of the case in a nutshell: The appellant, a retired Junior Engineer, was granted possession of a housing board property in Patna in 1982 and was given a perpetual lease in 1992. The property, later turned into a guest house, became the crux of a family dispute. His third son and daughter-in-law (respondents) were allowed temporary use of one room but allegedly extended their occupation by force and coercion. The daughter-in-law, according to the appellant, threatened false criminal charges and disrupted the running of the guest house. In 2022, the Maintenance Tribunal ordered their eviction. Though initially upheld by a Single Judge of the Patna High Court, the Division Bench set it aside, reasoning that eviction was not tenable in the absence of a direct claim for maintenance under Section 23(1) of the Act. Observation of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court reversed the Division Bench's order and restored the Eviction. It observed:  The appellant's ownership was undisputed and self-acquired;  The respondents' claim of ancestral ownership was baseless;  The Maintenance Tribunal has jurisdiction under the Act to order eviction when necessary to ensure the senior citizen’s welfare. The Court placed heavy reliance on S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors. [(2021) 15 SCC 730], emphasizing that the The tribunal 's authority includes eviction where it is an incident of enforcing the right to maintenance and protection. Apparent Contradiction of the judgment of Satmola Devi v. State of U.P. The ruling becomes especially intriguing when juxtaposed with the recent judgment in Satmola Devi v. State of U.P. [SLP(C) No. 2665 of 2023], also by the Supreme Court. In that case, the Court reaffirmed the requirement of a specific claim under Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act and held that eviction cannot be the primary relief unless there is a relinquishment or transfer of property subject to a condition of maintenance. It limited the scope of the Tribunal’s eviction powers, indicating that a civil suit might be the appropriate route for possession claims. Thus, Satmola Devi adopted a strict and narrow interpretation of Section 23(1), whereas Rajeswar Prasad Roy applies a liberal and welfare-centric view, aligning with the Vanitha precedent. Principals laid down in the case of S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors. In the case of S. Vanitha, the Court recognized that eviction may be justified even when the daughter-in-law resides in her “matrimonial home”, if her presence jeopardizes the senior citizen’s well-being. The Court nuanced the eviction powers of the Tribunal, suggesting they are inherent in the mandate to protect senior citizens, not solely contingent on conditional transfers. However, Vanitha did acknowledge the need to consider the competing interests—especially when eviction affects women’s rights under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Assessment: The present Rajeswar Prasad Roy judgment appears to tip the scale towards a senior citizen’s right to peaceful possession, perhaps at the cost of due process protections in property law and matrimonial rights. The divergence from Satmola Devi creates a doctrinal inconsistency:  Should eviction be tethered strictly to a conditional transfer of property (as in Satmola Devi)?  Or, should the Tribunal have broader discretion to evict any relative—including a son or daughter-in-law—when their conduct threatens a senior’s dignity and security (as in Rajeswar Prasad Roy and Vanitha)?

Conclusion: While Rajeswar Prasad Roy showcases the judiciary’s empathy towards the elderly and the practical challenges they face, it also reignites debates about overreach, due process, and conflicting statutory interpretations. A larger bench or legislative clarification may eventually be necessary to settle the scope of the Maintenance Tribunal’s powers under the 2007 Act. Until then, these decisions represent a judicial tightrope walk between protection and procedural fairness.