20 LEADING JUGMENTS ON 498A IPC

20 leading Judgments of the Supreme Court which command illegal arrest and misuse of Section 498A of IPC.

1. Kans Raj v. the State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2324:-

In this case, the Court observed that for the fault of the husband, the in-laws or any other relations cannot, in all cases, be held to be involved in the demand of dowry. In cases where such accusations are made, the overt acts attributed to persons other than the husband are required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In their over-enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case. Thus, charge-sheet and criminal prosecution against the in-laws were quashed.

2. Sushil Kumar Sharma v. UOI, (2005) 6 SCC 281:-

In this case, it was held by the Supreme Court that:- "Provision of S. 498A of Penal Code is not an unconstitutional and ultra virus. The mere possibility of abuse of a provision of law does not per se invalidate legislation. Hence plea that S. 498A has no legal or constitutional foundation is not tenable. The object of the provisions is the prevention of the dowry menace. But many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bonafide and have been filed with oblique motive. In such cases, the acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignominy suffered during and before trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra virus, does not give a license to unscrupulous persons to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the Courts have to take care of the situation within the existing frame-work." The Court also observes that a complaint under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was being filed based on a personal vendetta. Court further observed that by misusing the provision, new legal terrorism can be unleashed.

3.Neelu Chopra & Anr. v. Bharati, AIR 2009 SC(Supp) 2950:-

In this case, the appellant Neelu Chopra and Krishan Sarup Chopra are husband-wife and the respondent Bharti was their daughter-in-law. According to Bharati, her married life with Rajesh (son of appellants) was not very smooth as there were unreasonable demands for dowry and misbehavior from Rajesh and his parents. Thus, in 1993, Bharati filed a complaint against her husband and in-laws under Section 498A of IPC. In 2006, Rajesh expired and hence the present case only lies against the in-laws.

The Court observed that the complaint did not show as to which accused had committed what offence and what was the exact role played by these appellants in the commission of offence. There could be said something against Rajesh, as the allegations were made against him more precisely but he was no more and had already expired. Under such circumstances, it would be an abuse of the process of law to allow the prosecution to continue against the aged parents of Rajesh, based on a vague and general complaint which was silent about the precise acts of the appellants. The Court thus directed to quash the complaint under Section 482 of CrPC.

4 Manju Ram Kalita v. the State of Assam, (2009) 13 SCC 330:-

In this Case, the wife alleged that her marital relationship was not cordial as her husband used to torture her mentally and physically. She left her matrimonial home and started residing with her father but later got to know that her husband has remarried a lady. The husband was charged under Section 498A of IPC but he denied all the allegations and preferred an appeal before the apex court.

The court relying on several precedents observed that the meaning of “Cruelty” differs in each statutory provision and hence must be established in the context of Section 498A of IPC. The conduct of the man, the seriousness of his acts must be compared with the likeliness of the woman to commit suicide, etc. It must be established that the woman has been subjected to cruelty continuously or at least in close proximity of time of lodging the complaint. Petty quarrels would not come under the purview of “cruelty”. Accordingly, the Court set aside the conviction order under Section 498A of IPC.

5. Preeti Gupta & Anr v. the State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 3363:-

In this Case, the complainant Manisha was married to Kamal Poddar in the year 2006. In 2007, she alleged her husband and her husband’s relatives for demanding dowry and assaulting her physically. Thereafter, a complaint was filed under Section 498A and others of IPC.

An appeal was filed by Preeti Gupta, against the married sister-in-law and her husband against the impugned judgment passed by the High Court of Jharkhand.

The Court observed that the tendency of implicating the husband and all his immediate relations is not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of the criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. Hence, the courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must consider pragmatic realities while dealing with matrimonial cases.

In the present case, the allegations of harassment of the husband’s close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complaint are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the court directed to quash all the charges filed against the appellants as the same could not be proved.

6. Bhaskar Lal Sharma & Anr. v. Monica, (2014) 3 SCC 383:-

In this Case complainant, Monica married Vikas Sharma (son of appellants), who had two children from his first wife. After their marriage, the relationship between the husband and wife deteriorated and Monica left her matrimonial home. Thereafter, she filed a complaint against her husband and other appellants (father-in-law and mother-in-law) under Section 498A, 406, and 34 of IPC. Monica also claimed maintenance of 2 lakhs per month in addition to the interim maintenance.

The Supreme Court observed that all the essential elements required for an offence under Section 498A of the IPC were not fulfilled in the present case. The respondent took all coercive steps to ensure the presence of appellants in India without making any effort at conciliation. The court was of the view that merely because the mother-in-law kicked the daughter-in-law and threatened her with divorce, the same did not amount to cruelty under Section 498A of IPC. Thus, no case was made out against the appellants under Section 498A of IPC.

7. Arnesh Kumar v. the State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273.

The Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and Anr. has observed that the offence under section 498A IPC is cognizable and non-bailable has lent it a dubious place of pride amongst the provisions that are used as weapons rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the husband and his relatives arrested under this provision. The Court has taken note of the statistics under “Crime in India 2012 Statistics” published by the National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs which shows arrest of 1,97,762 persons all over India during the year 2012 for the offence under Section 498-A. Showing concern, the Court held that arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom, and casts scars forever and the police had not learned its lesson which is implicit and embodied in the Criminal Procedure Code. Commenting on the police, the Court said:- “It has not come out of its colonial image despite six decades of Independence, it is largely considered as a tool of harassment, oppression and surely not considered a friend of public. The need for caution in exercising the drastic power of arrest has been emphasized time and again by the courts but has not yielded the desired result. Power to arrest greatly contributes to its arrogance so also the failure of the Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the power of arrest is one of the lucrative sources of police corruption. The attitude to arrest first and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool for the police officers who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive.” The Court, thereafter, has distinguished between the power to arrest and justification for the exercise of it and analyzed Section 41 CrPC.

Section 41 stipulates when police may arrest without a warrant. The said provision reads as follows:- “41. When police may arrest without warrant.—(1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person— (a) who commits, in the presence of a police officer, a cognizable offence; (b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, namely:-- (i) the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has committed the said offence; (ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary-- (a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or (b) for proper investigation of the offence; or 19 (c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or (d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police officer; or (e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured, and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reasons in writing. Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of this sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest. (ba) against whom credible information has been received that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to more than seven years whether with or without fine or with a death sentence and the police officer has reason to believe based on that information that such person has committed the said offence. (c) who has been proclaimed as an offender either under this Code or by order of the State Government; or (d) in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property and who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing; or (e) who obstructs a police officer while in the execution of his duty, or who has escaped, or attempts to escape, from lawful custody; or (f) who is reasonable suspected of being a deserter from any of the Armed Forces of the Union; or (g) who has been concerned in, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been concerned in, any act committed at any place out of India which, if committed in India, would have been punishable as an offence, and for which he is, under any law relating to extradition, or otherwise, liable to be apprehended or detained in custody in India; or (h) who, being a released convict, commits a breach of any rule made under sub-section (5) of section 356; or (i) for whose arrest any requisition, whether written or oral, has been received from another police officer, provided that the requisition specifies the person to be arrested and the offence or other cause for which the arrest is to be made and it appears there from that the person might lawfully be arrested without a warrant by the officer who issued the requisition. (2) Subject to the provisions of section 42, no person concerned in a non-cognizable offence or against whom a complaint has been made or credible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having so concerned, shall be arrested except under a warrant or order of a Magistrate.”. Scrutinizing the said provision, the Court held as under:-

 “7.1. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that a person accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years with or without fine, cannot be arrested by the police officer only on his satisfaction that such person had committed the offence punishable as aforesaid. A police officer before the arrest, in such cases, has to be further satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or for proper investigation of the case; or to prevent the accused from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear, or tampering with such evidence in any manner, or to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to a witness to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court or the police officer; or unless such accused person is arrested, his presence in the court whenever required cannot be ensured. These are the conclusions, which one may reach based on facts. In pith and core, the police officer before arrest must put a question to himself, why arrest? Is it really required? What purpose it will serve? What object it will achieve? It is only after these questions are addressed and one or the other conditions as enumerated above is satisfied, the power of arrest needs to be exercised. In fine, before arrest first, the police officers should have reason to believe based on information and material that the accused has committed the offence. Apart from this, the police officer has to be satisfied further that the arrest is necessary for one or the more purposes envisaged by sub-clauses (a) to (e) of clause (1) of Section 41 CrPC.” The learned Judges, thereafter, referred to Section 41-A CrPC which has been inserted by Section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of 2009). The said provision is to the following effect:-

 “41-A. Notice of appearance before a police officer.—(1) The police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 41, issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice. (2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of that person to comply with the terms of the notice. (3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested. (4) Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of the notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by a competent court in this behalf, arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice.” Explaining the said provision, it has been ruled:- “The aforesaid provision makes it clear that in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under Section 41(1) CrPC, the police officer is required to issue notice directing the accused to appear before him at a specified place and time. Law obliges such an accused to appear before the police officer and it further mandates that if such an accused complies with the terms of notice he shall not be arrested, unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that the arrest is necessary. At this stage also, the condition precedent for arrest as envisaged under Section 41 CrPC has to comply and shall be subject to the same scrutiny by the Magistrate as aforesaid.” The Court further went on to say:- “10. We are of the opinion that if the provisions of Section 41 CrPC which authorizes the police officer to arrest an accused without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant are scrupulously enforced, the wrongs committed by the police officers intentionally or unwittingly would be reversed and the number of cases which come to the Court for grant of anticipatory bail will substantially reduce. We would like to emphasize that the practice of mechanically reproducing in the case diary all or most of the reasons contained in Section 41 CrPC for effecting arrest be discouraged and discontinued.” The directions issued in the said case are worthy to note:-

“ Our Endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not arrest the accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorize detention casually and mechanically. In order to ensure what we have observed above, we give the following directions:

11.1. All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41 CrPC; 11.2. All police officers are provided with a checklist containing specified sub-clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii); 11.3. The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention; 11.4. The Magistrate while authorizing detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorize detention; 11.5. The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing; 11.6. Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A CrPC be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing; 11.7. Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before the High Court having territorial jurisdiction. 11.8. Authorizing detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the Judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.”

8. Bibi Parwana Khatoon @ Parwana Khatoon v. the State of Bihar (2017) 6 SCC 792:-

In this case, it was alleged that the husband and his relatives killed the wife by setting her on fire. Aggrieved by the decisions passed by the lower Courts, the brother-in-law and the sister-in-law of the deceased preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court.

The court after going through the oral and documentary evidences has observed that the lower courts have erred in convicting the appellant. The evidences on the brother-in-law and sister-in-law torturing the deceased could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Further, the appellants used to reside in a different village and they had no common intention with the husband for committing the crime. Accordingly, the conviction were set aside.

9. Rajesh Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P., 2017 SCC OnLine SC 821:-

The Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Sharma (supra) issued the following guidelines to prevent misuse of sec. 498A IPC:-

 i) (a) In every district one or more Family Welfare Committees be constituted by the District Legal Services Authorities preferably comprising of three members. The constitution and working of such committees may be reviewed from time to time and at least once in a year by the District and Sessions Judge of the district who is also the Chairman of the District Legal Services Authority.

(b) The Committees may be constituted out of para legal volunteers/social workers/retired persons/ wives of working officers/other citizens who may be found suitable and willing.

(c) The Committee members will not be called as witnesses.

 (d) Every complaint under Section 498A received by the police or the Magistrate be referred to and looked into by such committee. Such committee may have interaction with the parties personally or by means of telephone or any other mode of communication including electronic communication.

 (e) Report of such committee is given to the Authority by whom the complaint is referred to it latest within one month from the date of receipt of the complaint.

(f) The committee may give its brief report about the factual aspects and its opinion on the matter.

(g) Till report of the committee is received, no arrest should normally be affected.

 (h) The report may be then considered by the Investigating Officer or the Magistrate on its own merit.

(i) Members of the committee may be given such basic minimum training as may be considered necessary by the Legal Services Authority from time to time.

 (j) The Members of the committee may be given such honorarium as may be considered viable.

(k) It will be open to the District and Sessions Judge to utilize the cost fund wherever considered necessary and proper. ii) Complaints under Section 498A and other connected offences may be investigated only by a designated Investigating Officer of the area. Such designations may be made within one month from today. Such designated officers may be required to undergo training for such duration (not less than one week) as may be considered appropriate. The training may be completed within four months from today; iii) In cases where a settlement is reached, it will be open to the District and Sessions Judge or any other senior Judicial Officer nominated by him in the district to dispose of the proceedings including closing of the criminal case if dispute primarily relates to matrimonial discord. iv) If a bail application is filed with at least one clear day’s notice to the Public Prosecutor/complainant, the same may be decided as far as possible on the same day. Recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail if maintenance or other rights of wife/minor children can otherwise be protected. Needless to say that in dealing with bail matters, individual roles, prima facie truth of the allegations, the requirement of further arrest/ custody and interest of justice must be carefully weighed; v) In respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of Red Corner Notice should not be a routine; vi) It will be open to the District Judge or a designated senior judicial officer nominated by the District Judge to club all connected cases between the parties arising out of matrimonial disputes so that a holistic view is taken by the Court to whom all such cases are entrusted, and vii) Personal appearance of all family members and particularly outstation members may not be required and the trial court ought to grant exemption from personal appearance or permit the appearance by video conferencing without adversely affecting the progress of the trial. viii) These directions will not apply to the offences involving tangible physical injuries or death.

10. Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar & Another v. UOI Ministry of Law and Justice & Ors., (2018) 10 SCC 443:-

After the Guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in the case of “Rajesh Sharma and Ors V. State of U.P. and Anr. AIR 2017 SC 3869 ” a writ petition W.P(C) NO.73 of 2015” has been filed by Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar and another Vs Union of India Ministry of Law and Justice and others and finally the Supreme Court passed the judgment thereby certain directions issued in the case of Rajesh Sharma and Ors V. State of U.P. and Anr. AIR 2017 SC 3869: 2017 (8) SCALE 313” has been overruled. The operating part of the judgments is as under:-

“In the aforesaid analysis, while declaring the directions pertaining to Family Welfare Committee and its constitution by the District Legal Services Authority and the power conferred on the Committee is impermissible. Therefore, we think it appropriate to direct that the investigating officers be careful and be guided by the principles stated in Joginder Kumar (supra), D.K. Basu (supra), Lalita Kumari (supra), and Arnesh Kumar (supra). It will also be appropriate to direct the Director-General of Police of each State to ensure that investigating officers who are in charge of the investigation of cases of offences under Section 498-A IPC should be imparted rigorous training concerning the principles stated by this Court relating to arrest. Given the aforesaid premises, the direction contained in paragraph 19(i) as a whole is not in accord with the statutory framework and the direction issued in paragraph 19(ii) shall be read in conjunction with the direction given hereinabove. . Direction No. 19(iii) is modified to the extent that if a settlement is arrived at, the parties can approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court, keeping in view the law laid down in Gian Singh (supra), shall dispose of the same. As far as direction Nos. 19(iv), 19(v) and 19(vi) and 19(vii) are concerned, they shall be governed by what we have stated in paragraph 35. 35 42. With the aforesaid modifications in the directions issued in Rajesh Sharma (supra), the writ petitions and criminal appeal stand disposed of.

11. Joginder Kumar v. the State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260:-

In the case, the Supreme Court has issued certain Guidelines to prevent the illegal arrest of the person:-

 “ No arrest can be made routinely on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person. It would be prudent for a police officer in the interest of protection of the constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in his own interest that no arrest should be made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness and bona fides of a complaint and a reasonable belief both as to the person’s complicity and even to the need to effect the arrest. Denying a person of his liberty is a serious matter. The recommendations of the Police Commission merely reflect the constitutional concomitants of the fundamental right to personal liberty and freedom. A person is not liable to arrest merely on the suspicion of complicity in an offence. There must be some reasonable justification in the opinion of the officer affecting the arrest that such arrest is necessary and justified. Except in heinous offences, an arrest must be avoided if a police officer issues notice to the person to attend the Station House and not to leave the Station without permission would do.” Again, the Court in the Joginder Kumar case (supra), while voicing its concern regarding complaints of human rights pre and after the arrest, observed thus:- “ A realistic approach should be made in this direction. The law of arrest is one of balancing individual rights, liberties, and privileges, on the one hand, and individual duties, obligations, and responsibilities on the other; of weighing and balancing the rights, liberties, and privileges of the single individual and those of individuals collectively; of simply deciding what is wanted and where to put the weight and the emphasis; of deciding which comes first—the criminal or society, the law violator or the law abider….”

12. D.K. Basu v. the State of W.B., (1997) 1 SCC 416:-

In the case of D.K. Basu v. the State of W.B.(1997) 1 SCC 416, after referring to the authorities in Joginder Kumar (supra), Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa and others(1993) 2 SCC 746 and State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Trivedi and others (1995) 4 SCC 262, the Court laid down certain guidelines which reproduce the same:- “(1) The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags with their designations. The particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be recorded in a register. (2) That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and such memo shall be attested by at least one witness, who may either be a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest is made. It shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall contain the time and date of arrest. (3) A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police station or interrogation center or other lock-up shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person known to him or having an interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place unless the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a relative of the arrestee. (4) The time, place of arrest, and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organization in the District and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest. (5) The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is detained. (6) An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the name of the next friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is. (7) The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined at the time of his arrest, and major and minor injuries, if any, present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time. The “Inspection Memo” must be signed both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee. (8) The arrestee should be subjected to a medical examination by a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by the Director, Health Services of the State or Union Territory concerned. Director, Health Services should prepare such a panel for all tehsils and districts as well. (9) Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, referred to above, should be sent to the Illaqa Magistrate for his record. (10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation. (11) A police control room should be provided at all district and State headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest, and at the police control room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board.”

13. Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 127:-

In the case of  Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others (2014) 2 SCC 127, the Constitution Bench, referring to various provisions of CrPC, adverted to the issue of conducting a preliminary inquiry. Eventually, the Court opined that the scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence and, thereafter, proceeded to state thus:- “ As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under: (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes (b) Commercial offences (c) Medical negligence cases (d) Corruption cases (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months‟ delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for the delay. The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.”

14.Manju Ram Kalita V. State of Assam (2009) 13 SCC 330:-

In this case, the wife has alleged physical and mental cruelty at the hand of her Husband and complained about section 498A IPC. The Court held that “Cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC is to be established in the context of Section 498-A IPC as it may be different from other statutory provisions. It should be determined by considering the conduct of the man, weighing the gravity or seriousness of his acts and to find out as to whether it is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide, etc. It is to be established that the woman has been subjected to cruelty continuously or at least in close proximity of time of lodging the complaint. The Court further held that petty quarrels cannot be termed as “cruelty” to attract the provisions of Section 498-A IPC.

15. Shobha Rani V. Medhukar Reddi 1988 SCR(1) 1010:-

In this case, the Supreme Court remarked that under Section 498A of IPC a new dimension has been given to the concept of cruelty. Explanation to Section 498 A of IPC provides that any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical of the woman), and harassment of the woman with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security would constitute cruelty.

In this case, it was held that evidence as to harassment to the wife to meet any unlawful demand for money is necessary to constitute cruelty in criminal law. This is the requirement of the offence of cruelty defined under Section 498 A of IPC. It was further held that cruelty need not be only intentional, willful, or deliberate. It is not necessary to prove the intention in the matrimonial offence. From the context and the set up in which the words `cruelty’ has been used in Section 13(1)(i-a) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 intention is not a necessary element in cruelty. That word has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term in matrimonial affairs. If the intention to harm, harass or hurt could be inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained of cruelty could be easily established. But the absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been deliberate or wilful ill-treatment. 16. Noorjahan v. State[(2008) 11 SCC 55]– The Supreme Court, in this case, attempted to explain the expression “cruelty” in the following words: “Consequences of cruelty which are likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical, of the woman, is required to be established to bring home the application of Section 498 A of IPC.” The Court also elaborates on the legislative intent behind the insertion of Section 498 A of IPC i.e. As clearly stated therein the increase in the number of dowry deaths is a matter of serious concern. The extent of the evil has been commented upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses to examine the work of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In some cases, the cruelty of the husband and the relatives of the husband which culminate in suicide by or murder of the helpless woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction involving such cruelty. Therefore, it was proposed to amend IPC, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only with cases of dowry deaths but also cases of cruelty to married women by the husband, in-laws, and relatives. The avowed object is to combat the menace of dowry death and cruelty. 17State of Maharashtra v. Ramesh Damodar More Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 2003, decided on May 11, 2017– In this recent case, it was held that for invoking the provisions of Section 306 of IPC (abetment of suicide) prosecution must establish that the deceased committed suicide as a result of cruelty provided to her within the meaning of Section 498 A of IPC and that the act of commission of suicide is abated by the accused. 18.Sunita Kumari Kashyap vs State Of Bihar And Anr.– Criminal Appeal 917 of 2011 Given the specific assertion by the appellant-wife about the ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands of the husband and his relatives at Ranchi and of the fact that because of their action, she was taken to her parental home at Gaya by her husband with a threat of dire consequences for not fulfilling their demand of dowry, the Supreme Court in the case held that in view of Sections 178 and 179 of CrPC, the offence, in this case, was a continuing one having been committed in more local areas and one of the local areas being Gaya, the learned Magistrate at Gaya had jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted therein. In other words, the offence was a continuing one and the episode at Gaya was only a consequence of the continuing offence of harassment of ill-treatment meted out to the complainant. That ill-treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused persons and in such continuing offence, on some occasion all had taken part and on other occasions, one of the accused, namely, the husband had taken part, therefore, undoubtedly Section 178(c) of CrPC is clearly attracted[8].

16.B.S. Joshi and others v. the State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 SCC 675: AIR 2003 SC 1386:-

In this case, the Supreme Court observed that  "There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy the unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counterproductive and would act against the interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that no exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of the Indian Penal Code.

17. Brij Lal v. Prem Chand and another (1989) 2 SCR 612:-

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that “It would not be out of place for us to refer here to the addition of Sections 113-A and 113-B to the Indian Evidence Act and Sections 498-A and 304-B to the Indian Penal Code by subsequent amendments. Section 113-A Evidence Act and 498-A Indian Penal Code have been introduced in the respective enactments by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983), and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and 304-B Indian Penal Code have been introduced by Act No. 43 of 1986. The degradation of society due to the pernicious system of dowry and the unconscionable demands made by greedy and unscrupulous husbands and their parents and relatives resulting in an alarming number of suicidal and dowry deaths by women has shocked the Legislative conscience to such an extent that the Legislature has deemed it necessary to provide additional provisions of law, procedural as well as substantive, to combat the evil and has consequently introduced Sections 113-A and 113-B in the Indian Evidence Act and Sections 498-A and 304-B in the Indian Penal Code. Because of Section 113-A, the Courts can presume that the commission of suicide by a woman has been abetted by her husband or relation if two factors are present viz. (1) that the woman had committed suicide within a period of seven years from her marriage, and (2) that the husband or relation had subjected her to cruelty. We are referring to these provisions only to show that the Legislature has realized the need to provide for additional provisions in the Indian Penal Code and the Indian Evidence Act to check the growing menace of dowry deaths...”

18.PREETI KUMARI VS. THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.( Crl. Appeal No.1387 of 2019):-

In this case, the main dispute is whether the appellant – wife could have filed a complaint under Section 498A, IPC at the place where she was residing. The High Court held that no cause of action has arisen where she was residing. This matter is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in Rupali Devi v. State of

U.P. & Ors. [(2019) 5 SCC 384]; wherein this Court held as follows:

 “10. The question that has posed for an answer has nothing to do with the provisions of Section 178 (b) or (c). What has to be really determined is whether the exception carved out by Section 179 would have any application to confer jurisdiction in the courts situated in the local area where the parental house of the wife is located.

 11. To answer the above question, one will have to look into the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Criminal Law [2nd Amendment Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983)] by which Section 498A was inserted in the Indian Penal Code. The section itself may be noticed

in the first instance:

"498A.Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,

"cruelty" means -

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.

 16. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498A of the

Indian Penal Code.”

In view of the above, the criminal appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

19. Rupali Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors. [(2019) 5 SCC 384:-

The question that has posed for an answer has nothing to do with the provisions of Section 178 (b) or (c). What has to be really determined is whether the exception carved out by Section 179 would have any application to confer jurisdiction in the courts situated in the local area where the parental house of the wife is located. To answer the above question, one will have to look into the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Criminal Law [2nd Amendment Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983)] by which Section 498A was inserted in the Indian Penal Code. The section itself may be noticed in the first instance:

"498A.Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,

"cruelty" means -

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.”

20. KAMLESH KALRA V. SHILPIKA KALRA & ORS.( Crl. Appeal No.416 of 2020 SUPREME COURT).

In this case, Husband has deposited stridhan articles, along with a pay order of Rs.598000/- with the investigation officer but the wife has refused to take the said article and pay order hence same was deposited in the police station. On appeal against the High court order, the Supreme Court has held that finding of the High Court does not call for interference. In the facts of the case, It is clear that FIR filed in this regard in 2015 was time-barred, having been filed much more than three years of separation of Manish Kalra and shilpika kalra and the filing of Divorce petition by the husband in 2009. In the fact of the case, the reason given by the High Court for quashing of proceedings under section 498A IPC is justified and does not call for interference by this court. The court further opined that since the husband has deposited the stridhan and pay order which the wife has refused to take the same hence charges under section 406 IPC is also not made out. The Supreme Court also held that it clearly appears that the filing of the criminal complaint is a pressure tactic, having been employed by the complainant against her husband, mother-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law, which is clearly an abuse of the process of the court and is liable to be quashed in toto.